The New Muslim Religious Brokers in European Cities and Politics of Muslim Citizenship by Pedziwiatr, Konrad
 
Charles Husband (ed.) 2012
Social Cohesion, Securitization and Counter-terrorism
Studies across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences 11.  
Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. 83–99.
The New Muslim Religious 
Brokers in European Cities and 
Politics of Muslim Citizenship
Konrad Pędziwiatr
University of Warsaw and Tischner European University
On the basis of the research into active social citizenship amongst the new Muslim 
religious brokers in Brussels and London, this paper explores the transition from 
the politics of Muslim identity to the politics of Muslim citizenship, a major change 
in the public mobilisation of Islam in Belgium and Britain. It argues that this move 
has been closely linked with the development of civic consciousness among certain 
segments of the Muslim populations in Europe and the construction of a new type 
of identity – ‘Muslim civicness’ - which is characterised by strong support for the 
national projects, activism beyond Muslim symbolic boundaries, emphasis on the 
similar rights to other citizens and obligations vis-à-vis all the citizens regardless of 
their religious adherence.
The outgoing Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain, one of the country’s 
organisations which aimed to represent British Muslims vis-à-vis the government1, 
announced during his valedictory speech on 4 June 2006 that ‘the age of the 
politics of Muslim identity is over’, and called for Muslims to engage more actively 
in non-Muslim civil society (Sacranie 2006). The sociological research on Islam in 
Europe shows, however, that the age of Muslim identity politics is far from yet over 
and that some Islamic organizations continue to take the ‘Muslim power’ approach 
(Modood 2003), mainly nourished by despair at the victimization of Muslims in 
different places around the globe; with the aim of attracting new followers.2 At the 
same time, and here the former Secretary General of the MCB has a point, one may 
observe a growing trend amongst the Muslim organizations to move from a politics 
of identity, which is preoccupied with difference and otherness, towards a politics 
of identity that increasingly emphasizes also elements of sameness. An analogous 
1 For more information about this and other Muslim organisations in Britain claiming to represent 
‘the country’s Muslims’ vis-à-vis the government see Pędziwiatr 2007.  
2 One such organisation is, for instance, Hizb ut-Tahrir. For more information about the organisation 
see Taj-Farouki 2003, Wiktorowicz 2005, Karagiannis & McCauley 2006.
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observation is made also by one of the editors of “European Islam: Challenges for 
Public Policy and Society”, Amel Boubekeur, who points out that ‘the cultural and 
religious otherness’ is no longer the privileged means of expressing contestation 
by the political Islam in Europe (2007: 40). The key observation in the research into 
religion and active social citizenship amongst young organized Muslims in Brussels 
and London on which this paper is based was that one may see in both analysed 
countries and cities not only a development of a civic consciousness among 
certain segments of their Muslim populations (Bousetta and Jacobs 2006: 32-33), 
but also a construction of a new type of identity - Muslim civicness - and a move 
from the politics of Muslim identity, largely based on the emphasis of ‘otherness’, 
to the politics of Muslim citizenship that increasingly stresses also elements of 
‘sameness’. This has been done by young Muslims inter alia ‘reversing the stigma’ 
associated with Islam and engaging with a ‘positivisation of the religion of their 
parents’.3
I am going to argue that the aforementioned change in the public mobilization 
of Islam in Europe is not so much related to the recent pressures on European 
Muslims to prove their loyalty and attachment to their societies4, but is above all 
a result of the re-definitions of the notion of citizenship, and of the fact that the 
largest Muslim communities in Europe are constituted today by a majority of people 
who are born and bred Europeans. The objective of this article will be to explore 
some processes behind a move from the politics of Muslim identity to the politics 
of Muslim citizenship.
Identity Politics and Citizenship
Before I do so, let me clarify some of the key notions used in the text and shed 
some light on the main features of the research which constitutes the basis for this 
paper. One such key notion is that of identity politics, a highly disputed concept 
both in politics and in theoretical writing. In a large sense identity politics refers to 
any political mobilization around a particular identity, be it ethnic, religious, civic, 
sexual (gender and sex equality, the gay rights movement) or functional (e.g. labour 
movement centered around the workers as a defined category) (Calhoun 1994). 
In this paper the concept is used primarily to refer to the mobilization of young 
European Muslims in which the notion of citizenship plays an important role. This 
last concept assumes that membership in a legally constituted political community 
should rest on a principle of formal equality. The principle of equality has been 
commonly defined in terms of a particular understanding of civil, political and social 
rights. The notion of positive freedom, understood as social rights, was introduced 
3 These strategies are explored in depth in Pędziwiatr 2010.
4  However partially it might be influenced by the securitization of debates about Islam in Europe
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into the concept of citizenship by T.H.Marshall (1950). One of the major drawbacks 
of the very influential Marshallian theory of citizenship is that it fails to address such 
salient issues in contemporary heterogeneous societies as the politics of ethnicity 
and diversity. This issue was addressed, inter alia, by Pakulski (1997) and Delanty 
(2002), who have argued that a fourth dimension (apart from civil, political and 
social) of citizenship could be culture. They have pointed out that today there are 
other kinds of exclusion which cannot be accommodated by a model of social 
rights. The recognition of these forms of exclusion has committed many people to 
the view that policies of universal equality would not be adequate and that therefore 
some kind of radical differentiation is necessary in the recognition of the group 
rights5 (e.g. Young 1990, Kymlicka 1995, Isin and Wood 1999).
The emphasis on the last component of citizenship may also be found in the 
scholarship of Bryan Turner, who argues that citizenship confers not just a legal 
status but also  “a particular cultural identity on individuals and groups”. He aptly 
notices that the main focus of citizenship struggles has shifted in recent decades 
from class to claims to cultural identity and cultural history. Today’s struggles have 
been not about the access to the means of production, but inter alia about sexual 
identities, gay rights, gender equality and aboriginality (Turner 1997: 8). I believe 
that with the advancement of the diverse European born generation of Muslims 
into the public sphere, and with the refusal of some of them to privatise Islam, 
we could also add religion to this list. Furthermore, I agree with Nilüfer Göle and 
Tariq Modood who point out that Muslims emerging into identity politics generally 
follow the example of ethnic minorities, women, gays and lesbians in seeking 
space for their heritage and values in both the public and private spheres (Göle 
2003: 812, Modood 2003: 102). The children of immigrants born in Belgium and 
Britain have been learning to take advantage of citizenship which is today one of 
the two, (besides the human rights) main discourses of entitlement. This exposes 
the growing tension between the discourse on equality (on civil, political and social 
levels), as a classical preoccupation of citizenship and the recognition of difference, 
(equality on the cultural level) as a contemporary engine of citizenship.
The important question is: why has citizenship been such a valuable political tool 
for allowing various groups to make different demands? The answer can be found 
in the scholarship of T.H. Marshal who, in his classic exposition, spoke of “an image 
of an ideal citizenship against which achievements can be measured and towards 
which aspirations can be directed” (1950: 29). It is thus nothing else but this ‘ideal 
citizenship’ that Muslims in various European countries have had in mind when 
demanding, for instance, that state authorities allow Muslim girls to wear hijabs at 
5 It refers to rights specific to particular groups of people (e.g. women, ethnic and religious 
minorities) which protect and enable realisation of the particular needs interests and priorities of 
these groups. These are the rights, which Isaiah Berlin saw as embodiment of the third form of 
freedom.
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school or to provide financial support to Muslim schools. The politics of citizenship 
has increasingly been a politics of recognition, in which claims are made for cultural 
rights and Islam has begun to play an important role in that politics.
 This politics of citizenship has been almost entirely urban politics. Numerous 
scholars have pointed out the close relationship between the city and contemporary 
citizenship. Michael Ignatiev, for instance, maintains that 
to speak of citizens is to speak of cities. It is in the city where we live as civic beings: 
it is the urban environment that releases in every minute the sensation of belonging or 
not belonging to something called political society (quoted in Bianchini and Bloomfield 
2001: 110). 
Also James Holston (1999: 189) emphasizes the importance of the urban 
experience for contemporary citizenship. He argues that as long as there are 
diverse populations residing in specific  places, and with new politics of identity 
and difference “the cities are challenging the nations, separating themselves and 
even replacing them, from an important space of citizenship to alive spaces, not 
only of their insecurities but also in their emergent ways”. The aforementioned 
authors share with many other scholars around the globe the same conviction that, 
although one of the essential purposes in the construction of a nation has been to 
disassemble the historical priority of the urban citizenship and to substitute it with 
a national citizenship, cities keep on being the strategic place for the development 
of the citizenry. That is also one of the reasons why the research which constitutes 
the basis for this paper has been carried out in two cities: Brussels and London.
In the course of the research the author has interviewed more than 50 young 
Muslim Brusselers and Londoners active within Muslim and wider civil society. The 
key informants, both women and men were selected from within the emerging new 
Muslim brokers; social actors of the second and third generations who participate 
directly or indirectly in the processes of decision making that are important for 
the future of Muslim and wider communities. The interviews concentrated in 
particular on these young Muslims (between the 20 and 38 years old) who try, 
through various projects, to tackle some of the issues faced by their communities 
and societies and thus at least partially solve the problem of collective uncertainty.6 
Through their social engagement, the young Muslim men and women begin to play, 
in the analysed countries ,a role of the new religious brokers.7 The research looked 
particularly closely at  the activists of Ligue Islamique Interculturelle de Belgique 
(LIIB) and Présence Musulmane (PM) in the case of Brussels and of the Islamic 
Forum of Europe (IFE) and City Circle (CC)  in the case of London. 
6 For an overview of scholarship on local elites see, for example, Tilleux 2003.
7 By religious brokers I mean individuals who play a key role in the articulation of the identity 
narrative, discourse.
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The oldest organizations in the two cities (i.e. LIIB, created in 1996, and IFE, set 
up in 1988) are structured around mosques in which members of the first generation 
still have significant authority. They are relatively progressive in comparison with 
some other Muslim establishments in the two countries (one may, for instance, 
hear khutbas or sermons in French and English, respectively, and women are 
not discouraged from participation in religious and non-religious activities) but 
are rather conservative by Western standards (e.g. strictly obeying the rules of 
purdah). The later organizations (PM, founded in 1996, and CC, set up in 1999) are 
neither attached to any mosques nor have any close links with the transnational 
religious movements. In contrast to the LIIB, which has close links with the Ikhwan 
Muslimun, and the IFE, which has links with Jamaat-i Islami, the PM and CC like to 
emphasize their organizational and intellectual independence. 
Apart from the interviews with activists of the above mentioned organisations the 
author has also conducted interviews with members of other Muslim associations in 
order to more accurately locate the key material within a wider spectrum of Muslim 
identity politics in both cities. Thus, a limited number of interviews were carried out 
with members of Federation of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations, 
Al-Qawthar, L’Humanité Sans Frontiers, Astrolabe and De Click in Brussels and 
activists of Muslimaat, Young Muslim Organisation, Muslim Association of Britain, 
Islamic Society of Britain and Hizb-ut Tahrir in London.8
Key Dimensions of Muslim Civicness
One of the most significant shifts in the mobilisation of Islam in Europe clearly 
visible in my research material is a slow though persistent move from the politics 
of Muslim identity to the politics of Muslim citizenship. This move has been closely 
linked with the development of a civic consciousness among certain segments of 
the Muslim populations in Europe, observed inter alia by Hassan Bousetta and 
Dirk Jacobs9 (2006: 32–33), and a construction of a new type of identity – ‘Muslim 
civicness’. This is a form of identity which prevailed amongst the members of the 
new Muslim religious brokers in Brussels and in London. It has been emerging 
from the shadows of ‘emancipatory politics’, and mixing elements of Muslimness 
with those of active citizenship. It is an identity which has numerous features of 
a ‘project identity’ defined by Castells as “a situation when social actors, on the 
basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that 
redefines their position in their society, by so doing seek the transformation of 
overall social structure” (ibid). Before I point out the key features of the Muslim 
8 For detailed conceptual and methodological information about the research and its informants 
see Pędziwiatr 2010.
9 Bousetta and Jacobs observe that, paradoxically, the radicalism of the jihadist discourse of bin 
Laden and his followers has stimulated a form of civic consciousnesses among Muslims.
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civicness as the project identity it is worth remembering that some segments of 
the Muslim populations in Europe remain characterised by the opposite of the 
project identity, which I call ‘uncompromising Muslimness’10, that is an identity 
that is generated by actors who feel that they are in positions/conditions devalued 
and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination. This kind of identity-building named 
by Manuel Castells as ‘resistance identity’ leads to the formation of communes 
and constructs forms of collective resistance against dominant identities (Castells 
2004: 9). Although it is traditionally utilised within minority groups, one may 
also observe it among majority groups. A form of such resistance identity is, for 
instance, ‘defensive identity’, which is constructed when members of the majority 
or a dominant cultural group feel threatened by the presence of other cultures 
(e.g. ‘aggressive little Englandism’).11 I believe the Muslim identity in Europe, which 
tries to resist the assimilationist pressures of the non-Muslim societies and their 
largely secular institutions by building trenches of resistance and survival and 
withdrawing from the mainstream social life can be seen as another example. A 
significant proportion of Muslims, who are involved in this kind of identity building, 
are those who cannot find their place in the ‘runaway world’, or those who are 
disempowered by stigmatizing representations of Islam. The case of many of them 
matches perfectly the classical explanation of the phenomenon of stigma by Erving 
Goffman, who argued that “the discrepancy between individual’s virtual and actual 
identity, when known about or apparent, spoils his social identity; it has the effect of 
cutting him off from society and from himself so that he stands a discredited person 
facing an unaccepting world” (1968: 31).
The first and foremost feature of Muslim civicness is that it fairly strongly supports 
national narratives. Its supportiveness for the national projects is not limited only to 
the emphasis of the importance of the identification with other compatriots, but also 
stresses the significance of the emotional attachment to the country in which one 
is living, its territory and various elements of the national culture, including national 
ceremonies and rituals. Thus, it quite firmly upholds the national identities and like 
the traditional accounts on citizenship (e.g. Marshall 1950 or Brubaker 1988) it links 
citizenship with a nation.
Probably most clearly this feature of Muslim civicness is portrayed in the 
statement of one of my interviewees from Brussels who said “I am a practising 
10 The key features of such identity are: dismissal of national projects (at the level of depth of 
citizenship), activism largely within Muslim symbolic boundaries (at the level of extent of citizenship), 
emphasis on the right to the difference and prioritisation of the obligations towards Muslim ummah 
(at the level of content of citizenship). For more detailed analysis of ‘uncompromising Muslimness’ 
see Pędziwiatr 2010.
11 Charles Husband analysed the construction of such defensive identity during the Rushdie 
affair through inspection of several newspapers. The editorial of one of them observed, referring 
to the anti-Rushdie demonstrations, for instance, that ‘we do not burn books in this country, even 
symbolically’ (1994).
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Muslim and a practising Belgian.” (Khalil, male, 27) For this interviewee, as well 
as many others, religious and national identity did not contradict each other, but 
on the contrary, they were mutually reinforcing. That is also why many of them 
liked to say similarly to Kadir (male, 31) that  “I am very comfortable being British 
and Muslim.” In their views the national and religious aspects of identity were 
largely overlapping. Consequently some of them strongly opposed more rigid 
definitions of secularism which exclude religion from citizenship. Hadijah (female, 
35), for example, stated: “you cannot cut someone in the middle and say that this 
part belongs to the citizenship and that to religion. Muslimness and citizenship 
are inseparable entities”. In general they proposed to view the two ‘entities’ as 
functioning in harmony with each other and opted for the pluralistic definition of 
identity, assuming the possibility of possessing multiple and hybrid identities. If 
they did distinguish between the two identities, like Rashid (male, 27) who pointed 
out that “spiritual identity is vertical and the civic one is horizontal”, they did so only 
to stress that they closely and positively interact with each other. 
Moreover the support for the national narratives that characterised most of 
my interviewees in Brussels and London involved also their strong emotional 
attachment to their countries and localities. The significant support for the effective 
identification model of citizenship (Weithman 2002: 14) amongst my British and 
Belgian interviewees was one of the evidences of such attachment. Here, however, 
it is important to note that when my interviewees were stressing that they should 
be viewed as part and parcel of British and Belgian societies they subscribed not 
to the unitary concept of a nation12, which does not leave a room for particular 
identities, but to the pluralistic definition of this term that takes into account the 
existence of such identities within a larger ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). 
The porousness of the boundaries of the Belgian and British national identities 
clearly helped my interviewees to claim ‘being the same’ and yet ‘being different’.
By supporting the national narratives the members of the emerging Muslim elites 
did not cease to identify with their co-religionists in other parts of the world. The 
sense of empathy and solidarity with Muslims living in other parts of the world was 
particularly strong amongst the British Muslims. The majority of my interviewees 
perceived the worldwide ummah as a community united by common beliefs, ethics 
and morality, rather than as a form of political and religious authority. For them 
also identification with other believers of Islam in the world did not exclude the 
identification with other compatriots. In their opinion these two identifications were 
not mutually exclusive and it was perfectly possible to be at the same time attached 
to their religious and national community.
At the level of the extent of citizenship, the research participants who did not 
mind calling themselves ‘practising Muslims and practising Belgians/Britons’ were 
12 For more information about the concept of a nation conceived in this way see Brubaker 1988. 
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characterized above all by the social activism which transgressed Muslim symbolic 
boundaries and aimed at improving wider society. The gathered research material 
portrays some of the projects undertaken by the members of the emerging new 
Muslim elites in Brussels and London, which clearly went beyond the traditional 
dawah13 and creatively engaged with wider society: raising money for hostels for 
homeless in London, joining the campaign for the ‘living wage’, feeding Brussels’ 
homeless and organising screening-debate sessions in the local cultural centre14. 
These examples illustrate how Muslim civicness manifests itself in practical terms. 
The young Muslims involved in these kind of projects were also happily volunteering 
for non-Muslim NGOs such as, for instance, Amnesty International, Greenpeace 
and Citizens Organising Foundation. For many of them it was not that important 
whether it was ‘an Islamic cause’, but above all they wanted to be sure that it was 
‘a just cause’. They were willing to lobby not only for Muslim causes, but also for 
non-Muslim ones. This impartiality was, for example, stressed by Murad (male, 
34) who said “…if a Jew is attacked, Muslims have to fight with the injustice done 
to him as if he was a Muslim (…).” The interviewees willing to engage in the fight 
for non-Muslim causes were also more likely than others to talk about the non-
Muslim issues that should be fought for. If they spoke about injustice in the world 
they did not concentrate only on Muslims in such places as, for instance, Palestine, 
Chechnya or Uzbekistan, but saw the problem of injustice much more globally and 
not limited only to their co-religionists.
At the level of citizenship rights Muslim civicness manifests itself above all in 
a strong emphasis on the right to sameness or full inclusion in the ‘nation’. The 
vast majority of the new Muslim brokers stressed that they would like to more 
fully participate in the ‘sameness’ and to be included in the more flexible and 
open conception of ‘us’. While maintaining their religious identity they wished to 
be recognised not only formally but also in practice in all dimensions of social 
life as citizens equal to others. They wanted their presence in the midst of the 
Belgian and British society to be banalised, or ‘taken for granted’. They believed 
that banalisation of their religious otherness might provide them with enough room 
to more openly manifest their religiosity and at the same time to be active citizens. 
If they called for the right to difference they framed such requests very carefully so 
as not to set themselves aside from wider society. They were also ready to resign 
from some of the privileges acquired by other religious groups (e.g. right to the 
state-funded religious schools). By and large, their requests had a character of 
acculturative demands rather than dissociative ones.
One of the major features of Muslim civicness at the level of citizenship obligations 
is that it puts emphasis on the importance of caring for all the members of the 
13 Literaly in Arabic “making an invitation” – usually denoting invitation to Islam or call to Islam. 
Muslim missionary activity.
14 All these projects are described and analyzed in detail in Pedziwiatr 2010.
Pędziwiatr
91
society regardless of their religious allegiance, or on having obligations vis-à-vis all 
the citizens without distinction of creed. In other words, it stresses that in everyday 
activities one should not only care about his or her co-religionists, family or kin, 
but also about other members of society. Numerous young Muslims interviewed in 
the course of the research, for instance, pointed out that they had obligations not 
only towards members of their own religious community, but also towards other 
members of wider society, and asserted that the latter obligations were equally 
important as the former. Nabihah (female, 28) in Brussels, for example, argued 
that “(…) Our work should profit not only Muslims but also others.”, whereas Samar 
from London said that “The obligation of a citizen is to contribute to the society: 
to do something meaningful. Not only make a difference to my life, but to make a 
difference to lives of others.”
The opinion of Thaqib (male, 20) from London that “Being a good Muslim and 
a good citizen is synonymous” points out yet another significant feature of Muslim 
civicness, namely that this identity frames and/or situates the demands of the faith; 
to which those of citizenship are highly compatible. Most of my interviewees in 
Brussels and London believed that if these demands were at times not compatible, 
then such sporadic incompatibilities were easily solvable. Moreover, many of 
them also argued that their religious convictions pushed them to fulfil citizenship 
obligations with greater attention and that religion made citizenship obligations 
more meaningful to them. The gist of this idea was captured by Khalil (male, 27) 
who spoke about Islam as “an engine of citizenship”. In his view, which was widely 
shared by my interviewees in Brussels, as well as in London, it was religion which 
gave a deep meaning to such rudimentary civil/civic duty as, for instance, casting 
a ballot. It also underpinned numerous more abstract civic obligation such as, for 
example, honesty, helpfulness, truthfulness, justice, industriousness, etc., which 
unlike the civil obligations cannot be enforced by the law. 
Muslim Civicness as a Project Identity
Having pointed out the most significant features of Muslim civicness, it is time 
to shed more light on this identity that is being developed by numerous young 
Muslims in Europe and which was particularly popular amongst my interviewees. 
The popularisation of this identity has been one of the major factors contributing to 
the significant shift in the mobilisation of Islam in Europe from the politics of Muslim 
identity to the politics of Muslim citizenship. As I have argued earlier, Muslim 
civicness bears many traits of the ‘project identity’ (Castells 2004: 9). Muslim 
civicness redefines the social position of Muslims engaged in its development and 
transforms social structures mainly by challenging the traditional public-private 
sphere divide (e.g. the popular understanding of the role of religion in the public 
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life) and by calling for the transformation of the existing power structures between 
the ‘established’ and the ‘outsiders’ (Elias & Scotson 1965).
According to the dominant narrative, the public sphere is not a privileged domain 
of religion, and especially so, if it is a religion of a relatively newly established 
minority group.15 As Talal Asad reminds us, religious practice and belief are highly 
welcomed (since without the idea of religion the concept of the secular cannot 
exist) but mainly in the private sphere or in the space where it cannot threaten 
political stability and the liberties of a ‘free-thinking’ citizen (2003). By asserting 
the importance of Islam not only in the private sphere but also in the public one, 
my interviewees clearly transgress the boundaries drawn by modern liberal states. 
By the very fact of mobilizing politically along religious lines they de-centre a 
fundamental public-private distinction of a modern liberal state, which sees religion 
as a matter of personal rather than public concern. At the same time they do not 
call for the total abolition of this distinction, like some more radical believers, but 
for its rebalancing. They seek a gradual transformation of the existing structures, 
rather than revolutionary change. By emphasizing the importance of religion not 
only in the private domain but also outside of it, they also suggest that political 
secularism is not religiously neutral and, as such, it should not be taken for granted. 
As numerous feminist scholars have shown (e.g. Benhabib 1992, Fraser 1992, 
Lister 1997 and Voet 1998) the assumption that difference must be privatized works 
as a ‘gag-rule’ to exclude matters of concern to marginalized and subordinated 
groups (such as, for instance, women) who want erstwhile private gender relations 
to be the subject of collective deliberation and reform. Thus, what would earlier be 
called ‘private’ matters have become the basis of the struggle for equality.
By extension, toute proportion gardée (proportions kept), the same might be said 
of the religious practice of European Muslims. Their political integration in terms of 
equality inevitably involves challenging the existing boundaries of the public realm. 
As Tariq Modood (2004: 247) notices, such integration essentially flows from 
the process of discursive engagement, as marginal groups begin to confidently 
assert themselves in the public space, and others begin to argue with and reach 
some agreement with them. The focus of this process of discursive engagement 
is on participation in a discursive public space, while equality becomes defined 
as inclusion within a political community, not in terms of accepting the rules of the 
existing polity and its hallowed public-private boundaries, but rather in terms of 
some redefinition of the existing rules and boundaries. In this respect the advances 
achieved, for instance, by feminism (with its slogan ‘the personal is the political’) 
15 It is not without importance which religious group strives for more room in the public sphere. 
Some newly set up Christian evangelical communities find it much easier to claim such a space 
than, for example, Muslim groups. The former ones are, in fact, re-claiming it, while the latter one 
claiming it the first time in the history of the analysed countries. 
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have acted as benchmarks for subsequent groups, such as Muslims, who have 
introduced new categories of identity into politics .
The meaningful engagement of young European Muslims in a discursive 
public space has above all been possible due to their possession of substantial 
cultural capital. Embodied and institutional cultural capital16 has enabled members 
of the emerging new Muslim elites in Brussels and London to choose between 
different courses of action and to move beyond the formal to participatory forms of 
citizenship. In other words, substantial cultural resources (if not in the institutional 
forms - formal education - then in the embodied one resulting from the fact of 
going through the process of socialisation in the given country) have allowed them 
to enact their citizenship status or to take up a role of citizen and engage with it 
creatively from within their religious tradition. These resources have allowed them 
to become subjects without distancing themselves from one of the major sources 
of authenticity that they have at their disposal, namely their religion. Their sense 
of agency, or the belief that they can act, has been visibly strengthened by the 
possessed cultural capital. Acting as a citizen, especially collectively, as Ruth Lister 
rightly notices, in turn fosters such a sense of agency (1997: 38). 
The form which they could enact, that is legal citizenship, is also of crucial 
importance. The role of a citizen enabled them to present themselves as equal 
and, to some extent, similar to others around them and thus, provided them with 
a significant tool to challenge the ‘established’, and try to at least minimally shake 
their domination in the discursive public sphere. As Elias and Scotson (1965) 
demonstrate in their study of ‘Winston Parva’ in East Midlands of England, this 
domination is not easily shakeable since the communal feelings of belonging and 
ownership, membership of important community roles, integration into informal 
(and formal) local networks and local knowledge, and many other resources give 
established groups the upper hand in the ‘relations of definition’ between themselves 
and newer groups. All of these power resources also enable the established to 
make their evaluations stick and, as the practice shows, these evaluations are 
rarely favourable to those who are ‘less established’. This is because established 
groups tend to generate ‘group charisma’, or a sense of their own superiority as 
a group, based on a ‘minority of the best’ as part of their social and self-identity. 
Their self-image tends to be based on evaluations rooted in the best aspects of the 
group whilst ignoring other elements that might contaminate such an image and, 
as such, it forms an important aspect of the group’s internal solidarity and sense 
of community. This ‘rosy’ self-image of the established is sustained through the 
vital mechanisms of communal ‘gossip’ and everyday conversation. Established 
16 Both terms are used in the sense given them by Pierre Bourdieu (1986) that is as “long-lasting 
dispositions of the mind and body; individual’s ‘culture’ or ‘cultivation’ assimilated or acquired 
over a long period” (embodied cultural capital p. 243-245), and as “educational qualifications” 
(institutionalised cultural capital p. 248)
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groups produce ‘praise-gossip’17 when discussing their own group, but use ‘blame-
gossip’18 to describe other groups, which they do not consider as ‘one of theirs’ or 
‘established enough’ (ibid).
European Muslims, viewed by many ‘established’ Europeans as outsiders, are 
often targets of stigmatizing labels. Their relative lack of substantial power resources 
(as a whole group), leaves them vulnerable to the gossip and stigmatization of 
more powerful groups. Over time, some of them come to accept and take on the 
stigmatized form of identity created for them by the ‘established’. They come to 
see their own group as inferior and see themselves as inferior people, idealizing 
and imitating the established’s behavioural codes, manners and so on in order to 
raise their valuation of themselves. This, according to Elias and Scotson, reduces 
their power chances even further by reinforcing claims to the superiority of the 
established. Furthermore, the generational transmission of stereotypes ensures 
that ‘outsiders’ are continually reminded of their interior status (ibid). 
The aforementioned scenario, however, does not take into account the fact that 
‘outsiders’ with the passage of time also start (faster or slower19) to acquire some 
power resources and are not doomed to accept forever stigmatising labels. This is 
clear, for instance, when comparing the situation of the Black people in America in 
1950s and in 2009, when the African American candidate Barack Obama became a 
new incumbent in the White House. The example of African-Americans who, more 
than half a century ago, started to actively challenge their negative stereotypes and 
create their own positive evaluations (e.g. ‘black is beautiful’)20 also demonstrates 
that the outsiders-established relations are not easily erasable and are often part 
of the long-term process of social change over many generations. Moreover, these 
long-term processes are subject to a reversal of present trends, rather than being 
simply linear pathways which once embarked upon become somehow inevitable.
In the analysed cases of Muslims in Belgium and Britain one may also observe 
a process of a narrowing of the gap between their own and the established’s 
power. At the same time many of the established continue to view their Muslim 
17 ‘Praise-gossip’ means that the best elements perceived by the established group form the basis 
for discussion and evaluation whilst negative elements are not openly discussed. (Elias & Scotson 
1965: 92-93)
18 ‘Blame-gossip’ is exactly the reverse, as outsider groups are discussed and assessed in terms 
of what are considered to be their worst elements. (Elias & Scotson 1965: 92-93)
19 This largely depends on the structure of a given society. One may expect that in a society 
with high social mobility such a process should be relatively fast. The state and to a lesser extent 
supranational bodies (e.g. European Commission, United Nations) act as important mediators in the 
relations between the ‘established’ and the ‘outsiders’.
20 The shifting balance of power between white and black groups in America is clearly explored, 
with the usage of the established-outsiders framework, by Dunning 2004. For an analysis of the civil 
rights movements from the social movements’ perspective see McAdam et al. 1996 or McAdam 
1999.
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compatriots born in Europe as outsiders. The new Muslim religious brokers possess 
some power resources that allow them to at least partially reduce the scale of the 
‘blame-gossip’ generated by the established. Those who are developing Muslim 
civicness have learnt to reject the stigmatising labels of the established without 
rejecting the whole system created and largely run by them.21 This seems to be 
an efficient strategy for redefining their position in societies, which is a key goal 
of project identities. Armed with legal citizenship, substantial civic skills and other 
resources, they are beginning to quite successfully ‘break into the bounded Britain 
and Belgium’.22 They are beginning to achieve some success not only in contesting 
the hegemonic constructions of the cultural and religious boundaries of the British 
and Belgian nations, but also in opposing elements of the ‘blame gossip’ generated 
by the established. The first task they accomplish, for instance, by demonstrating 
their in-depth knowledge of Belgian and British society and profound affection to 
their respective countries. Challenging ‘blame gossip’ is done by writing to local and 
national newspapers or appearing in TV and Radio programmes and correcting 
some of the fairly widespread derogatory images of Muslims and Islam.23 
In conclusion, however, it must be stressed that the relative success achieved 
by Muslim groups in shaking the domination of the ‘established’ in the discursive 
public sphere and re-balancing the relations between themselves and non-
Muslim Belgians and Britons are not definite and irreversible. On the contrary, 
these achievements can be erased fairly easily and the significant gap between 
the power chances of the ‘outsiders’ and the ‘established’ can be re-created. 
This was particularly noticeable after the terrorist attacks committed in the 
name of Allah on 11 September 2001 (USA), 11 March 2004 (Spain) and 7 July 
2005 (Britain).24 The attacks marked the point when one could clearly observe 
an increase in the ‘blame gossip’ trying to force as many people of Muslim faith 
as possible to accept ‘group disgrace’. At the same time, after the attacks it was 
possible to see numerous symptoms of a reversal of the process leading to the 
more equal balance of power between the established and outsiders. Interestingly, 
these temporary reversals in the processes of power re-balancing seemed not to 
discourage members of the Muslim communities already involved in the public 
21 Those who develop uncompromising Muslimness, on the other hand, tend to reject not only the 
stigmatizing evaluations, but also the whole system within which they are generated.
22 This expression I have borrowed from Sean McLoughlin (1997) analyzing how representations 
of belonging of the Muslim in Bradford challenge the hegemonic constructions of the racial, cultural 
and religious boundaries of Britain.
23 How widespread such images are in Belgium and Britain may be gleaned from, for example, 
Allen and Nielsen 2002 or EUMC 2006.
24 One could add to these list of ‘turning points’ in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims 
in the West  the religiously motivated murder of Theo van Gogh on the streets of Amsterdam on 
2 November 2004. Although of much smaller scale, this event had a tremendous impact on the 
collective memory of not only the Dutch, but all Europeans since for the first time a European Muslim 
of Morrocan origin kills his compatriot in the name of supposed defense of “honour of Islam”. 
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sphere from even more active involvement. The members of the emerging new 
Muslim elites were particularly successful in turning the stigma associated with 
their religion into a source of empowerment or ‘group charisma’ rather than ‘group 
disgrace’. This has been happening in the situation of increasing politisation of Islam 
in Europe which has resulted also in the growing demand for knowledge about 
Islam and Muslim populations in Europe and elsewhere. Some of this demand has 
been met by a growing number of scholars studying various kinds of processes 
within the European Muslim and other Muslim populations. There is, however, not 
only a continuous demand for an expert knowledge on Muslim populations, but 
also for the opinions of all types of community representatives, ranging from the 
internationally acknowledged Muslim leaders, through self-proclaimed religious 
leaders to ordinary believers or Muslim Monsieurs and Madames tout-le-monde. 
This is a niche to which many Muslims active in all kinds of Islamic organisations 
have been taping into. My interviews with young Muslims in Britain and Belgium 
show that they are fully aware of this demand and consciously take advantage of 
the occasions it creates. This is, for example, clear in the following statement by 
Rana (female, 36): “Since 9/11 there are more people who want to know about 
Muslims and Islam, so it gives a good opportunity for those who practice Islam to 
show what really Islam is about”.
The young Muslims as those who are absolutely fluent in French in the case 
of Brussels and in English in the case of London have some advantages over the 
religious leaders educated abroad and not fully mastering the countries’ languages. 
Again my research shows that some of the young Muslims are fully aware of this 
advantage. One of my interviewees said “We live the transitory phase between the 
first generation and future generations, and we begin to understand that we have 
become a kind of a relief group. So they (e.g. journalists – KP) ask us because it 
is much easier for them from the linguistic point of view… So we have gone with 
difficulties through this passage between the transmission of religion by silence to 
the obligation of almost automatically becoming actors”. (Faisal, 33) At the same 
time some of my interviewees complained that the opportunity to inform the public 
about Islam has been opened up only for some discourses on Islam and talked 
at length about the disillusionment with the media coverage of Islam and anxiety 
related to the growing anti-Muslim sentiment.25
It is important to stress that the channel of ‘empowerment-through-
stigmatisation’ is only open for those members of the Muslim communities who 
possess the necessary tools to deal with the stigma resulting, for instance, from 
the traumatic events. This also proves the phenomenon of the double capacity of 
cultural traumas observed by numerous scholars (Sztompka 2002, Alexander et 
al. 2004), which in spite of their immediate negative, painful consequences, show 
25 Other forms of empowerment of new Muslim elites through Islam and activism in Muslim 
organizations are explored at length in Pędziwiatr 2012.
Pędziwiatr
97
their positive, functional potential as forces of social becoming.26 On the whole, 
my interviewees possessed the necessary resources to turn the stigmas, such as 
those resulting from the aforementioned traumatic events, to their advantage. Those 
who were engaged in developing Muslim civicness even in the most unfavourable 
circumstances took pains to stress a strongly held religious belief and used Islamic 
practice in order to interact more effectively with the rest of society. The late Ottavia 
Schmidt di Friedberg described such attitudes, which characterised also some of 
her interviewees, as ‘riding the tiger’ (2002: 89). In my opinion this metaphor aptly 
captures not only the risks involved in maintaining such an attitude, but also the 
difficulty in using one of the major emerging global symbols of contestation of the 
West (i.e. Islam) to interact with the members of European (Western) societies.
Conclusion
The February 2008 cover of Time Magazine (vol. 171, no. 6) featured faces of 
members of the European Muslim elite and some of my interviewees with the title 
‘Europe’s Muslim Success Story’. Today this ‘success story’ is shared only by a 
small proportion of the European Muslims and members of their communities, 
while the majority experiences serious levels of exclusion and disadvantage. The 
improvement of the situation of the Muslim communities in Europe will depend not 
only on the effective struggle against at least some of the forms of exclusion and 
disadvantage faced by the members of these communities, but also on the results 
of the Muslims’ efforts to re-invent and re-position themselves as citizens and full 
members of the European polities. The latter objective is particularly difficult to 
attain. Before European Muslims achieve this goal they will need to work tirelessly 
to reconstruct popular images, assumptions and representations of their religion 
and their communities within wider societies. The members of the new Muslim 
elites have been already doing so and they will surely not rest until they achieve 
some tangible results. 
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